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This study explores how a self-fulfilling prophecy can solve a social di-
lemma. We ran two experimental treatments, baseline and automata. Both 
consisted of a finitely repeated public goods game with a surprise restart. In 
the automata treatment it was announced that there might be automata play-
ing a grim trigger strategy. This announcement became a self-fulfilling 
prophecy. That is, most participants actually followed a grim trigger strategy 
in the automata treatment resulting on an increase on the average contribu-
tions to the public good relative to the baseline treatment. Moreover, four 
out of nine groups managed to fully cooperate almost until the last period. 
Furthermore, after the surprise restart, when the automata threat is less 
credible, subjects’ behavior was very close to that in the original game. 
 
Keywords: self-fulfilling prophecy, public goods game, grim trigger strat-
egy, cooperation, automata, beliefs  
 




A ‘self-fulfilling prophecy’ is a prediction that, in being made, actually causes itself to be-
come true. The term was coined by the sociologist Robert K. Merton. We claim social di-
lemmas, like the voluntary contribution to a public good, may sometimes be solved by a 
self-fulfilling prophecy that induces cooperation. Many situations in real life can be mod-
eled as a public goods game: keeping water wells in a good shape in Kenya as described by 
Ted Miguel and Mary Kay Gugerty, 2005; voluntary contributions to National Public Radio 
affiliates as studied by Jen Sheng and Rachel Croson, 2005; or even teamwork in organiza-
tions like described by Bengt Holmstrom, 1982. Sanctioning is a well known mechanism to 
maintain high contributions to a public good (see e. g. Ernst Fehr and Simon Gaechter, 
2000). However, sanctioning can be only applied to some contexts, for instance to team-
work situations or to public goods in small communities. Sanctioning has at least two prob-
lems. First, it requires identifying the individual to be punished, which might not be obvi-
ous. Second, it can trigger a chain of retaliations and make cooperation to collapse (see 
Nikos Nikoforakis, 2004). 
To design a self-fulfilling prophecy we looked at the experimental evidence in re-
peated public goods games in which it is a dominant strategy to contribute zero to the pub-
lic good. However, in experiments, individual contributions start typically quite high, 
around 50% of the endowment on average, and they decline over time to less than 10% of 
the endowment. This behavior cannot be explained entirely as learning. Indeed, the experi-
mental literature, e. g. James Andreoni (1988), shows how contributions jump up to 50% of 
the endowment after a surprise restart. A variety of studies1 on public good games explain 
experimental results through reciprocity or conditional cooperation. These studies usually 
identify two types of subjects, cooperators and free riders. They observe that most of the 
time cooperators only keep giving high contributions to the public good if other people in 
the same group do the same; these are the so-called conditional cooperators. Free riders 
contribute zero most of the time making conditional cooperators contribute less. Thus, av-
erage contributions decline across time. Nevertheless, rational free riders should cooperate 
                                                 
1 See e.g., Robert Sugden (1984), James Andreoni (1995), Thomas Palfrey and Jeffrey Prisbey (1997), Rachel 
Croson (1998), Urs Fischbacher et al. (2001), Claudia Keser and Frans van Winden (2000), Jordi Brandts and 
Arthur Schram (2001) or Rachel Croson et al. (2005). 
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if they know there are conditional cooperators in the group. That would mean sustained 
cooperation after a surprise restart. However, this is not found in the experimental litera-
ture. We find a couple of plausible explanations. The first is the lack of coordination of 
conditional cooperators in initial contributions. Indeed, most subjects contribute a signifi-
cant amount of their endowment. However, a contributor of 80% of her endowment might 
feel exploited by somebody else contributing only 40% thus decreasing her contribution in 
the following period. On the other hand the reaction to very low contributions is usually not 
fast and strong giving more incentives to free ride after a restart. 
Our candidate to work as a self-fulfilling prophecy is the grim trigger strategy. It 
can be formulated as “fully contribute to the public good while everybody does, contribute 
zero forever otherwise.” Playing a grim trigger strategy would solve the coordination prob-
lem mentioned in the former paragraph. In addition, the response to low contributions 
would be the strongest. Even for a fully rational and self-regarding individual it makes 
sense to cooperate until the next to the last period if he thinks some of their partners are 
going to play the grim trigger strategy. This individual would contribute zero until the last 
period if they detect a deviation from cooperation. Hence, it makes sense for fully rational 
and self-regarding individuals to become grim trigger strategy players, except for the last 
period. Furthermore, a player who is sure there is no grim strategy player but thinks the 
other players believe there might be some grim strategy players has no interest in educating 
them. That is, a cooperative result not only depends critically on what are each player’s 
beliefs about the existence of grim strategy players, but also in second, third or actually nth-
order beliefs. It is therefore unclear whether a grim trigger strategy threat can work as a 
self-fulfilling prophecy with real players in the experimental lab. 
We designed an experiment in which participants play ten periods of a public goods 
game in groups of four people. After period ten there was a surprise restart and the same 
game was played for another ten periods. Group composition never changed across periods. 
Players received information about their own and other group members’ contributions. 
However, it was not possible to identify the actions of a certain player. Contributions were 
shown each period sorted from highest to lowest. In the baseline treatment the game was 
exactly the one described so far. In the automata treatment we told subjects they are in a 
group together with 0, 1, 2 or 3 automata that play a grim trigger strategy. The automaton 
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would start by contributing a random amount between 90% and 100% of their endowment 
and they would keep doing it while everybody else in the group contributes at least 90%. 
Otherwise, automata would switch to contribute between 0% and 10% of their endowment. 
We did not provide any clue about what the number of automata in a certain group might 
be. Actually, there were 0 automata in all groups. Note that, if participants start fully con-
tributing to the public good in the first period it will be hard to disprove the existence of 
grim strategy players. Indeed, since it is not possible to know how a certain player behaves 
across periods, the existence of automata can be only completely disprove if all four players 
do something not in line with the grim trigger strategy in the same period. This would be 
the case if subjects cooperate until period 9 and all contribute zero in period 10. Since 
automata are supposed to do some randomization there might be a ‘back-door’ way to con-
clude there are no automata by looking at contributions which do not seem to be random. 
However, a particular subject might think he understands contributions do not look random 
enough, but he can also think the others are not able to detect that lack of randomness. In 
this case it would be in his interest to keep playing the grim trigger strategy himself until 
the next to the last period. The interest of our surprise restart is to stress-test the power of 
the self-fulfilling prophecy. A fully cooperative restart will indicate that the prophecy is 
still causing itself to become true. 
 In the experiments, every player in every group in the automata treatment started 
contributing 90% of his endowment or more in period one. Cooperation unraveled in some 
groups because some player contributed zero.  Nevertheless, four out of nine groups man-
aged to fully cooperate until period eight, three until period nine. The self-fulfilling proph-
ecy itself did not unravel. In period one of a surprise restart 51 out of 54 individuals playing 
the automata treatment contributed 90% of their endowments or more. In both the original 
ten periods and the restart average contributions were always higher than in the baseline. In 
line with the grim strategy, results are very polarized in the automata treatment, meaning 
that most of the time participants contributed 90% of their endowments (or more) or zero. 
Moreover, conditional cooperation pattern is altered in the automata treatment: the lagged 
average contribution of group partners is a good predictor of behavior for the baseline, but 
the minimum contribution among group partners is not. Exactly the opposite is true for the 
automata treatment. 
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 Those results indicate that our design managed to generate a self-fulfilling prophecy 
which resulted in higher average contributions. In the context of our simple experimental 
environment, automata treatment can be thought of as an attempt to change the “corporate 
culture” that the subjects face.  Of course, in a more complex and stochastic environment, 
the grim trigger strategy itself would be too rigid as a rule to use to sustain cooperation in 
the long term.  But our results suggest that the amount of cooperation may be susceptible to 
influence through attempts to change the expected behavior of participants. 
 Section 2 explains the experimental design and procedures. Section 3 contains a 
discussion, Section 4 explains the results and Section 5 concludes. Finally, there is an Ap-
pendix including individual contributions organized in a table, summary statistics and a 
translation of the experimental instructions.  
 
2. Experimental design and procedures 
In our experiment subjects played a ten periods repeated public goods game. In any period 
players had to choose a contribution to a public fund. This contribution was an integer be-
tween 0 and 50. Four players formed each group. The sum of the contributions given by the 
four players was multiplied by two. Then, this amount was equally split among the mem-














where j stands for group members from 1 to 4 and gi is his individual contribution. 
  This game was repeated ten times by the same group. Then, there was a surprise 
restart and ten additional periods were played by the same group. Players received informa-
tion about their own and partners’ contributions. However, there was no possibility of iden-
tifying a particular player’s contribution across periods. In each period contributions were 
displayed without identifiers ordered from highest to lowest. 
We compare two treatments. In the baseline treatment2 human subjects played the 
game described so far. In the automata treatment participants were told: “In each group 
there might or might not be some computer simulated subjects. A number between 0 (there 
                                                 
2 We use the same baseline as in Rachel Croson et al. (2005). 
 6
are no computer simulated players) and 3 (you are the only non-computer simulated player) 
has been determined by the computer. You will not be informed at any time about the char-
acteristics of other group members, either simulated or human.” Nevertheless, in the ses-
sions run there were always 0 automata. 
Participants were informed about the strategy automata played. This was a “noisy 
grim trigger strategy.” That is, automata would cooperate until any group member defects. 
If there is any defection the automata would then defect until the end of the game. The 
strategy was noisy in the sense that automata would pick an integer from 45 to 50 when 
cooperating and an integer from 0 to 5 when defecting. There was the same probability of 
picking a particular number in each interval.  
We ran two sessions of each treatment. There were three groups per session in the 
baseline. We had four groups in one of the automata treatment sessions and five in the 
other. So, finally we gathered six and nine independent observations for the baseline and 
the automata treatment s, respectively. All the experiments were run at the Lineex lab in 
University of Valencia (Spain) using Urs Fischbacher’s (1999) z-Tree toolbox. Average 
payoff including a 5 EUR show-up fee was 19.71 EUR. 
 
3. Discussion 
The aim of our study was to determine empirically whether a self-fulfilling prophecy can be 
set-up in a public goods game resulting in higher contributions and higher payoffs to par-
ticipants. This is an empirical question and we look for an answer in the experimental lab. 
A fully rational and self-regarding player in this experimental environment must realize that 
the possibility of an automaton playing the grim strategy presents an opportunity for ra-
tional cooperation by eliminating the assumption of common knowledge of rationality as 
explained by David Kreps et al., 1982.  
A self-regarding and fully rational agent who thinks groups can be only composed 
of other rational players and automata will cooperate (C), meaning play between 45 and 50, 
to avoid automata retaliations and/or to look like an automata himself, or defect (D), mean-
ing play zero. For the same player, a sequence of actions can never contain cooperation 
after defection. That rules out, for instance, a sequence like CCDCCCCCCD, where C 
means to contribute 45 of more and D means to contribute 0. This is so because automata 
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will never cooperate after observing somebody contributes less than 45. Moreover, in equi-
librium the same rational player must also start playing D immediately after observing 
somebody contributes less than 45. Indeed, it makes no sense to keep cooperating because 
the automata would now contribute from 0 to 5 and cooperation cannot be sustained with 
other rational and self regarding players. 
Our design opens the door for beliefs such as “there are three grim trigger automata 
players in my group” which makes a best response to cooperate until the next to the last 
round.   
Less demanding beliefs also allow cooperative outcomes. For instance, “there is one 
grim trigger automaton in my group and the rest of us are fully rational” is enough to make 
cooperation plausible in period nine. Consider the backwards induction process. In period 
ten the rational players should defect. In period nine, if cooperation has been maintained so 
far each rational player plays the game shown in table 1. 
 
Table 1.  Player R Payoffs at Period 9 
 
 Number of other R players cooperating 
 0 1 2 
C 872.5 895 940 
D 895 917.5 940 
 
Conditional on these beliefs there are two equilibria in period 9, everybody plays C or eve-
rybody plays D. In this example, backwards induction does not generate a unique non-
cooperative equilibrium.  
 Furthermore, it is also possible to think of circumstances in which a rational player 
has incentives to behave as an automaton even though he is sure there are no automata in 
his group. Other group members might have wrong beliefs, but a rational player has no 
interest in showing them the truth. 
 One of the most interesting features of our automata treatment is it is actually very 
hard to obtain valuable information. If all four group members start cooperating the only 
way to disprove the existence of grim trigger strategy players is if all four group members 
violate the grim trigger strategy at the same time. Otherwise, there will always be the pos-
sibility there is at least one automaton. 
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 Moreover, for non-fully rational individuals the grim trigger strategy is relatively 
safe to play. In the worst case scenario a given player fully cooperates in the first period 
and everybody else contributes zero. Hence, that player is going to make 25 units instead of 
50 in the first period and 50 from period two to ten, it represents only a 5% loss over con-
tributing always zero. If just one other player fully contributes in the first period there is no 
loss at all, and every other possible scenario offers higher profits than contributing zero all 
the time.  
 Finally, it is plausible that many people who participate in economic experiments 
are not able to put together a contingent action plan, that is, a strategy. They learn the grim 
trigger strategy from our experimental instructions and just use it. It is also plausible that 
most participants in economic experiments want to be cooperative to some extent, but they 
are afraid to be exploited. They might start contributing an amount bigger than zero in the 
first period to signal that they would actually like to cooperate. If these initial contributions 
are different, the ones who contribute more can think they are actually being exploited and 
decrease their contributions in the following rounds. This lack of coordination in the first 
period makes cooperation unravel. The grim trigger strategy offers a coordination mecha-
nism, starting with a ‘suggested’ first period contribution. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Periods 1 to 10 
A mere glance at the individual data illustrates how differently contributions are distrib-
uted. Every individual in every group in the automata treatment started contributing on or 
over the grim trigger strategy threshold. Whereas data coming from the baseline are widely 
spread along the whole [0, 50] interval, automata treatment data are strongly polarized: 
subjects tend to contribute either 0 or in the [45, 50] interval. The number of times some-
body contributes any positive amount between 0 and 45 units is very small, around 10% on 
average. In fact it is: period 1 (0%), period 2 (3%), 3 (3%), 4 (17%), 5 (8%), 6 (17%), 7 
(25%), 8 (14%), 9 (14%) and 10 (14%). 
Figure 1 shows the whole set of contributions for both the baseline (left) and the 
automata treatment (right). Periods are represented on the horizontal axis and contributions 
on the vertical axis. The diameter of the bubbles represents how many subjects in the base-
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line or the automata treatment contribute a particular amount in a particular period. Striped 
bubbles represent contributions greater or equal to 45, solid grey bubbles represent contri-
butions higher than 5 and smaller than 45, white bubbles represent contributions greater or 
equal to 0 and smaller than 6.  Clearly, we observe that in the automata treatment subjects 
tend to contribute either 45 or 0, while in baseline contributions are much more scattered. 
 
Figure 1: Individual contributions per treatment (periods 1 to 10) 
  































In the automata treatment 156 out of 360 times (43%) participants played ‘45’ while 
in the baseline they did it just 3 times out of 240 (1.3%). In contrast, 110 out of 360 
(30.5%) subjects played ‘0’ in the automata treatment while 35 out of 240 (14.6%) did it in 
the baseline.  
 
Result 1: By inspection, the grim trigger strategy threat causes polarization: subjects tend 
to contribute 45 (or more), or 0. 
 
Figure 2 shows the average contribution to the public goods in both treatments. The 
automata treatment average is always over the baseline. Note how average contributions in 
the automata treatment start over 90% of the endowment whereas in the baseline, on aver-
age, subjects start contributing around half of their endowment. Contributions decay across 
time in both treatments. 
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Table 2 shows estimations using random-effects regressions which include individ-
ual (subject) dummies.  The first two rows contain information about the sample used and 
the periods considered. The explained variable is the individual contribution for all three 
models. Explanatory variables are Period, a dummy representing the automata treatment, 
the average contribution of partners in the previous period (AvgContt-1), the minimum con-
tribution of partners in the previous period (MinContt-1). 
 
                       Table 2: Panel data estimations (periods 1 to 10)  
 [1] [2] [3] 
Sample All Bas Aut 
Periods 1-10 1-10 1-10 
    
Period -2.47*** -0.78*** -0.81** 
Automata 12.44*** - - 
AvgContt-1 - 0.49*** 0.18 
MinContt-1 - 0.16 0.53*** 
Const 29.52*** 10.65*** 12.64***
    
R2-overall 0.23 0.43 0.59 
N 600 216 324 
 
***α ≤ 1%; ** α ≤ 5%; * α ≤10% 
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Result 2: there is a significant and huge treatment effect. ‘Automata’ is significant at 1% in 
model [1]; contributions are 42% higher in the automata treatment than in the baseline 
treatment.  
 
 Mann-Whitney tests confirms result 2, contributions are significantly different be-
tween treatments for periods 1***, 2***, 3***, 4* and 10* (see table A3). Result 3 sup-
ports the existence of significant differences in later rounds. 
 
Result 3: there is a significant and similar decline in contributions in both treatments. ‘Pe-
riod’ is significant at 1% in models [1], [2] and [3]. 
 
 Models [2] and [3] detect a change in the conditional cooperation pattern. The 
lagged average contribution of group partners (AvgContt-1) is significant in the baseline3, 
but the minimum contribution among group partners (MinContt-1) is not. However, the op-
posite is true for the automata treatment. This is not surprising, for a grim trigger strategy 
player the only thing that matters is whether the minimum contribution is under 45. 
 
Result 4: the conditional cooperation pattern is altered by the treatment effect: AvgContt-1 
is a good predictor in the baseline and MinContt-1 is not significant. Exactly the opposite is 
true for the automata treatment. 
 
4.2. Updating beliefs 
We can trace for each subject the maximum believable number of automata (MBNA). That 
is, the maximum number of automata compatible with the information a certain subject has 
at a particular time. Our automata play a noise grim trigger strategy. First of all, if the ob-
served behavior is not noisy enough it cannot come from automata. We ran a battery of 
tests to check this aspect (see table A2 in the Appendix). If we consider that a player is able 
to remember the 30 contributions made by the other three members of his group during 
periods 1-10 our Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test rejects “enough noise” in 35 out of 36 
                                                 
3 This result is close to the one observed in Rachel Croson et al. (2005), where different conditional coopera-
tion patterns are observed depending on the strategic structure of the game. 
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cases. We obtain the same result if we suppose that a player can remember only 20 contri-
butions. If we allow an individual just to remember 10 contributions the test rejects 
“enough noise” 23 out of 36 times. Moreover, if we look at the series of individual contri-
butions in order to check whether they are noisy enough to perfectly imitate automata be-
havior, a KS test only accepts it for players S32 (Z=0.949, p=0.329) and S73 (Z=0.949, 
p=0.329). We can conclude that, although for a perfectly rational individual there is not 
enough noise compatible with the existence of automata there is indeed enough noise for 
some individuals if they cannot remember more than 10 contributions. Furthermore, it is 
always possible some players think they can deduce that there are no automata but other 
players cannot, so lack of common knowledge of rationality may persist. 
 Let us suppose hereafter players are not able to perceive whether or not subjects’ 
behavior is noisy enough to come from a randomization process. Suppose they are still able 
to trace behavior compatible with a grim strategy. Table A1 in the Appendix shows the 
MBNA for each subject at every period. Notice that, at the time of the restart, MBNA for 
all individuals in groups 7 and 9 is bigger or equal than two. Some players in groups 3, 5, 6 
and 8 cannot believe in the existence of more than one automaton. Players S13 in group 1, 
S22 in group 2 and S41 in group 4 must be sure there are not automata at all in his group. 
There is no group in which everybody can be sure there are no automata, therefore, the 
prophecy that there is a grim trigger strategy player can still make itself true. 
   
4.3. Periods 11 to 20 
At the end of period 10 most players, 35 out of 36, can detect that there are no automata if 
they are sophisticated, meaning they can detect the insufficient randomization. If they are 
not sophisticated, i.e. if they can only detect strict departures from the grim trigger strategy, 
there are only three players who must know there are no automata at all. All but three sub-
jects (S11, S51 and S53) started contributing 45 or more in period 11. Furthermore, those 
three who have to be sure there are no automata (S13, S22 and S41) also contributed 45 or 
more. 
Figure 4 shows individual contributions after the restart for both the baseline and the 
automata treatment. The figures look very similar to those corresponding to periods 1-10. 
Now, in the automata treatment there are 158 out of 360 ‘45s’ (43%) and 104 ‘0s’ (29%). 
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In the baseline treatment there were just 2 out of 240 ‘45s’ (0.83%) and 33 ‘0s’ (13.8%). 
Everybody in groups 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9 started contributing 45 or more. Only one indi-
vidual in group 1 and two in group 5 started contributing less than 45.  
It has to be pointed out that everybody in group 1 (after period 11) and in group 4 
(after period 14) should know about the inexistence of automata. Cooperation unravels in 
both groups. It would be very interesting to see what happens in these groups after a second 
restart. 
 
Figure 4: Individual contributions per treatment (periods 11 to 20) 
  
































Result 5: By inspection, after a surprise restart the grim trigger strategy threat still causes 
polarization: subjects tend to contribute 45 (or more), or 0. 
 
Figure 5 shows average behavior in periods 11 to 20. Average contributions in the 
automata treatment are again over average contributions in the baseline. 
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Table 3 shows estimations using random-effects regressions which include individ-
ual (subject) dummies.  The only difference with respect to table 2 is that now data comes 
from the restart, periods 11 to 20. 
 
                      Table 3: Panel data estimations (periods 11 to 20)  
 [4] [5] [6] 
Sample All Bas Aut 
Periods 11-20 11-20 11-20 
    
Period -2.60*** -1.36*** -1.49*** 
Treatment 14.94*** - - 
AvgContt-1 - 0.50*** 0.15 
MinContt-1 - -0.15 0.58*** 
Const 29.02*** 15.55*** 16.63***
    
R2-overall 0.29 0.28 0.64 
N 600 216 324 
 
***α ≤ 1%; ** α ≤ 5%; * α ≤10% 
 
Models [4], [5] and [6] give even stronger results than [1], [2] and [3] (included in Table 2). 
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Result 6: there is a significant and huge treatment effect. ‘Automata’ is significant at 1% in 
model [1]; contributions are 51% higher in the automata treatment than in the baseline 
treatment.  
 
Again, Mann-Whitney tests confirm result 6; contributions are period by period signifi-
cantly different between treatments except for period 19 (see table A3). 
 
Result 7: there is a significant decline in contributions. ‘Period’ is significant at 1% in 
models [4], [5] and [6]. 
 
 Models [5] and [6] detect a change in the conditional cooperation pattern. The 
lagged average contribution of group partners (AvgContt-1) is significant in the Baseline, 
but the minimum contribution among group partners (MinContt-1) is not. However, the op-
posite is true for the Automata Treatment. This is not surprising, for a grim trigger strategy 
player the only thing that matters is whether the minimum contribution is under 45. 
 
Result 8: the conditional cooperation pattern is altered by the treatment effect: AvgContt-1 
is a good predictor in the baseline and MinContt-1 is not significant. Exactly the opposite is 




This study analyses how subjects behave in a repeated public goods game under a grim 
strategy threat. The purpose of doing that was to see whether a self-fulfilling prophecy can 
help to solve social dilemmas like public goods games. We ran 10+10 period public goods 
games with 4-player groups to explore how this threat affects individual contributions. We 
use a baseline treatment and an automata treatment in which subjects are informed about 
the possibility of being in a group together with 0, 1, 2 or 3 automata playing a grim strat-
egy. There were zero automata in every group.  
 
Our experimental results suggest that:  
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i) The grim strategy threat induces subjects to contribute significantly more in repeated 
public goods games.  
ii) The grim strategy threat causes subjects produces very polarized results. Subjects ei-
ther contribute 45 (or more) or 0, very much in line with a grim trigger strategy. The 
prediction “there might be somebody playing a grim trigger strategy” causes itself to be 
true. 
iii) The conditional cooperation pattern is altered by the treatment effect: the lagged av-
erage contribution of group partners is a good predictor of behavior for the Baseline, 
but the minimum contribution among group partners is not. However, the opposite is 
true for the Automata Treatment.  
iv) The self-fulfilling prophecy survived a surprise restart. That is, i), ii) and iii) still 
hold in a second batch of ten periods even when there is very limited support for a ra-
tional expectation about the existence of automata in most groups. 
These results raise other questions. For instance, it is not clear whether similar effects 
can be attained by just announcing the grim trigger strategy. It should be also interesting to 
allow subjects to commit to play the grim trigger strategy. Furthermore, it would also make 
sense to examine different strategies. 
Our results suggest that cooperation may be influenced by the social culture of partici-
pants, i.e. their expectations about what strategies others employ. Changes in the way this 
culture is transmitted and shared by individuals seem to have a mayor impact in their be-
havior and their expectations about future events. Whether or not these results hold for 
more complex and stochastic environments, where the grim trigger strategy itself would be 
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Appendix: Table A1. Maximum believable number of automata4  
 
  S11 S12 S13 S14 S21 S22 S23 S24 S31 S32 S33 S34 S41 S42 S43 S44 S51 S52 S53 S54 S61 S62 S63 S64 S71 S72 S73 S74 S81 S82 S83 S84 S91 S92 S93 S94 
1 45 45 50 45 45 45 45 50 50 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 50 45 45 45 50 45 45 46 50 46 45 45 45 45 45 45 50 
2 50 50 0 45 46 45 45 0 48 47 45 46 45 45 45 1 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 49 45 45 45 45 45 50 45 45 45 
3 30 45 0 45 0 45 0 0 45 46 45 45 45 0 0 0 0 45 45 45 47 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 50 45 
4 35 5 50 30 20 0 20 40 45 50 45 46 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 46 45 45 46 50 45 47 45 47 45 45 45 45 0 45 47 
5 20 45 0 30 0 0 0 0 45 45 45 45 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 45 45 45 45 45 45 48 45 45 50 45 45 0 0 0 45 
6 25 5 0 15 5 0 0 45 45 47 47 45 2 0 0 0 20 0 0 45 50 45 45 45 45 45 50 45 45 46 50 45 0 0 0 0 
7 5 0 5 2 0 10 0 50 45 50 45 46 2 10 10 10 0 0 0 0 45 45 45 50 45 45 46 45 45 46 47 45 0 0 0 40 
8 15 30 0 45 0 0 0 0 45 48 45 45 5 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 49 45 45 47 45 45 47 45 50 45 45 45 0 0 2 0 
9 25 45 0 40 10 0 0 0 45 47 45 45 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 45 45 45 46 45 45 46 45 0 45 0 45 0 25 0 0 
10 30 0 0 43 0 10 0 3 0 45 45 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 45 45 0 47 45 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 
11 30 45 50 45 46 45 45 50 45 50 45 45 45 45 45 45 0 45 0 50 45 45 45 45 45 45 48 45 45 45 50 45 45 45 50 45 
12 45 45 50 45 0 50 45 45 45 45 45 50 45 45 45 46 0 0 0 0 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 46 45 48 45 45 45 45 45 
13 25 50 50 45 5 0 0 47 45 46 45 46 40 45 45 45 0 0 25 45 47 50 45 45 46 45 46 45 45 45 45 45 45 50 47 45 
14 45 50 50 0 10 5 0 45 45 45 45 45 25 45 45 44 0 0 25 0 47 45 45 45 45 45 47 45 45 0 45 45 46 45 45 45 
15 20 50 25 40 7 5 0 0 45 47 45 46 38 45 45 45 0 0 25 0 45 45 45 45 45 45 50 45 0 0 0 0 46 45 46 45 
16 30 45 50 40 0 0 0 25 45 46 45 45 45 25 25 15 0 0 0 0 50 45 45 45 47 45 45 45 0 0 0 0 47 45 48 45 
17 35 45 45 25 5 0 0 48 45 45 45 46 35 40 40 0 0 0 0 0 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 45 0 40 0 0 48 45 45 45 
18 25 50 50 0 8 0 0 0 50 46 45 45 12 35 35 1 0 0 0 0 45 45 45 45 45 45 46 45 0 0 0 0 47 45 48 45 
19 20 45 0 45 0 0 0 0 45 50 45 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 46 45 45 45 45 45 45 0 0 0 0 48 45 48 45 
20 15 0 0 20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 10 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 0 0 45 45 0 0 0 0 0 45 0 0 
                                     
 50 3 automata                   50 3 automata 
 50 2 automata 
 
                  50 2 automata 
 
 50 1 automaton                   50 1 automaton 
 50 0 automata 
 
                  50 0 automata 
 
                                                 
4 Different gray tones represent in the table represent the maximum number of automata a particular subject may believe on at a certain time (regardless of ran-
dom behavior). For instance, in period 3 subject S13 have to be sure there are no automata on his group because none of his partners behaved consistently with 
the grim strategy in the former period. Subject S72 can believe there are three automata in his group until period 19. 
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Table A2. Randomization tests 
 “10”  “20”  “30” 
 Sample N K-S  Sample N K-S  Sample N K-S 
vs11 10 10 1.58***  20 20 2.90***  30 24 3.47***
vs12 10 10 1.58***  20 18 2.82***  30 18 2.82***
vs13 10 10 1.58***  20 17 2.66***  30 17 2.66***
vs14 10 10 1.58***  20 20 2.68***  30 22 2.98***
vs21 10 10 2.21***  20 20 3.80***  30 26 4.51***
vs22 10 10 1.58***  20 20 3.69***  30 27 4.35***
vs23 10 10 1.58***  20 20 3.35***  30 25 4.00***
vs24 10 10 2.53***  20 20 4.02***  30 25 4.60***
vs31 10 10 0.94  20 20 2.01***  30 30 3.46***
vs32 10 10 1.58***  20 20 3.13***  30 30 4.38***
vs33 10 10 0.63  20 20 1.78***  30 30 3.28***
vs34 10 10 0.63  20 20 2.23***  30 30 3.65***
vs41 10 10 2.21***  20 20 3.80***  30 27 4.61***
vs42 10 10 1.58***  20 20 2.90***  30 28 3.96***
vs43 10 10 1.58***  20 20 2.90***  30 28 3.96***
vs44 10 10 1.89***  20 20 3.57***  30 28 4.53***
vs51 10 10 2.84***  20 20 4.24***  30 30 5.29***
vs52 10 10 2.84***  20 20 4.24***  30 29 5.19***
vs53 10 10 2.84***  20 20 4.24***  30 29 5.19***
vs54 10 10 ----  20 20 ----  30 29 --- 
vs61 10 10 1.58***  20 20 3.35***  30 30 4.56***
vs62 10 10 0.94  20 20 2.46***  30 30 3.83***
vs63 10 10 0.94  20 20 2.46***  30 30 3.83***
vs64 10 10 1.89***  20 20 3.57***  30 30 4.74***
vs71 10 10 0.63  20 20 2.23***  30 30 3.65***
vs72 10 10 0.63  20 20 2.01***  30 30 3.46***
vs73 10 10 2.53***  20 20 4.02***  30 30 5.11***
vs74 10 10 0.63  20 20 2.23***  30 30 3.65***
vs81 10 10 1.58***  20 20 3.35***  30 30 4.56***
vs82 10 10 1.58***  20 20 3.35***  30 30 4.56***
vs83 10 10 0.63  20 20 2.46***  30 30 3.83***
vs84 10 10 0.63  20 20 2.68***  30 30 4.01***
vs91 10 10 0.63  20 20 2.46***  30 30 3.83***
vs92 10 10 0.63  20 20 2.46***  30 30 3.83***
vs93 10 10 1.26*  20 20 3.13***  30 30 4.38***
vs94 10 10 1.26*  20 20 3.13***  30 30 4.38***
            
Summary 
# rejections 23 63%   35 97%   35 97% 
# non-rejections 13 36%   1 3%   1 3% 
 
***α ≤ 1%; ** ≤ 5%; * ≤10% 
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The purpose of this experiment is to study individual decision making. Instructions are simple and you follow 
them carefully you will receive an amount of cash confidentially at the end of the experiment. That is, nobody 
will be informed of the payoffs of other participants. You can ask any question to us by raising your hand. 
Any other communication between participants is forbidden and it will be punish with the immediate expul-
sion from the experiment. 
 
1. The experiment consists of ten independent rounds. You will be a member of the same 4 people 
group throughout all the ten periods. The results of each group are completely independent from oth-
ers. 
 
2. In each group there might or might not be some computer simulated subjects. A number between 0 
(there are no computer simulated players) and 3 (you are the only non-computer simulated player) 
has been determined by the computer. You will not be informed at any time about the characteristics 
of other group members, either simulated or human. 
 
3. At each period every participant receives an amount of 50 Eurocents (ECU). Your only decision is to 
decide how many do you want to assign to a Common Account. The remaining Eurocents will be as-
signed to your Private Account. 
 
4. Profits from your Private Account equal the amount you assigned to it and they are independent of 
other people decisions. 
 
5. Profits from your group’s Common Account are determined according to the sum of money assigned 
to this account by everybody in your group (that is, what you decide to assign plus what the other 
three group members decide to deposit on the Common Account). This sum is multiplied by two and 
divided in four equal parts, one for each group member. 
 
6. Computer simulated subjects follow a simple rule. They will assign a randomly determined amount 
between 45 and 50 ECU to the Common Account in the first period and they will keep doing the 
same in following periods while everybody else in the group assigns at least 45 ECU to the Common 
Account. Otherwise, they will they will assign to the Common Account a randomly determined 
amount between 0 and 5 ECU.  
 
7. Summarizing, you profit in a determined round will be determined in the following way: 
 
Profit =  Profit from Private Account                 +         Profit from Common Account 
 
  50 Eurocent – what I assigned to the    +              (2 x Common Account)/4 
  Common Account 
 
8. You will be paid your 10 period accumulated profits privately at the end of the experiment. 
 
9. You will see the amounts everybody in your group assigned to the Common Account sorted from the 
biggest to the smallest, but you will not know who assigned what. You will see also the sum of 
money assigned overall, that is, the Common Account. Moreover you will be informed of your prof-
its, differentiating what comes from the Common Account and the Private Account. 
 
 
 
 
 
  
